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Rising Wage Dispersion between White-Collar and Blue-
Collar Workers and Market Concentration: The Case of 
the USA, 1966-2011
*
  
by Ilhan Dögüs 
Abstract 
In this paper, I address the simple question “What types of employees have been 
steadily paid more by what type of employers?” and I suggest that rising market 
concentration has a significant structural impact on the wage differentials between 
white and blue-collar workers. The innovative contribution of this paper is to reveal 
this relationship of structural causality, which has been hitherto absent from the 
literature. The argument is tested via fred.stlouisfed annual datasets for the USA 
between 1966 and 2011 using Vector Autoregressive Model. The findings show that the 
responses of wage dispersion to one-unit shock in market concentration are positive 
and significant over a period of 10 years. Furthermore, 18% of variations in wage 
dispersion in the short-run and 30% of variations in the long-run are explained by 
market concentration. 
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Dögüs: Rising Wage Dispersion and Market Concentration 
… [T]he struggle about money-wages primarily affects the distribution of the aggregate 
real wage between different labour-groups, and not its average amount per unit of 
employment, as we shall see, on a different set of forces. The effect of combination on 
the part of a group of workers is to protect their relative real wage. The general level of 
real wages depends on the other forces of the economic system. 
(Keynes, 1936: 14) 
 
1. Introduction1 
The stagnancy of wages in last decades in the USA (Pew Research)
2
 refers to 
observation of overall average wages. However, the decomposition of real wages 
reveals that whereas the real hourly wages of the 10
th
 percentile has decreased by 6,77% 
and of the 50
th
 percentile by 5,98% from 1980 to 2011, the real hourly wages of the 90
th
 
percentile has increased by 28,6% during the same period (stateofworkingamerica.org, 
Figure 4C). The share of the top 1% of wage-earners in the USA has increased from 
7,7% in 1980 to 14,1% in 2007 (stateofworkingamerica.org, Figure 4G).  
An April 2016 Issue Brief of Council of Economic Advisers (CEA)
3
 reports that market 
concentration in the USA has increased and that “for 1977-2013 firm entry rates have 
declined over time, whereas firm exit rates have been more or less steady” (CEA, 2016: 
5). “[B]y using plant-level data from the U.S. Census Bureau covering the entire 
manufacturing sector over the 1997 to 2007 period,” Blonigen and Pierce (2016: 4) of 
the Federal Reserve Board found that “evidence for increased average markups from 
M&A activity is significant and robust” (ibid., 24). In addition, some New-Keynesian 
studies
4
 have documented the rise in markup in the US due to increased market 
concentration at the macro level. For example, the Aggregate Price-Cost Markup 
calculated by Nekarda and Ramey (2013: 11) has a similar path as my own calculation 
of market concentration (See Figure 1) by way of the ratio of value added to the wages 
of production workers as based on Gordon (1998)
5
. Other datasets that confirm the 
increase in market concentration in the USA at the macro level are as follows: 
Percentage of U.S. Manufacturing Industries in which Largest Four Companies 
Accounted for at Least 50 Percent of Shipment Value in Their Industries, 1947-2007 
(Foster et al. 2012; see Figure 4) and asset share of top 100 firms (Brennan, 2016: 16). 
                                                          
1
 This paper is a part of cumulative dissertation which deals with the relationship between market 
concentration and financialisation by way of the widening wage gap between white collar and blue-collar 
workers. 
2
 http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/10/09/for-most-workers-real-wages-have-barely-budged-
for-decades/ 
3
 https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea 
4 See Afonso and Jalles (2015), Nekarda and Ramey (2013), Gali (1994), and Gali et al. (2007). 
5
 In subsection 4.1, the measurement of concentration by way of the ratio of value added to the wages of 
production workers will be discussed in detail. 
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Figure 1: Market concentration (Degree of monopoly=Ratio of value added to the wages of 
production workers) and Wage differential (=ratio of salaries of ancillary workers to the wages of 
production workers). 1966-2011, annual data, USA. Sources: Own calculations based on 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/. 
Market structure plays a crucial role with respect to wage inequality, since the “struggle 
about money-wages” (Keynes, 1936) is different across different types of employees 
and employers and also “because the structure determines the behavior of the firms” 
(Sawyer, 1981: 147). More precisely, the greater bargaining power of workers 
employed by large dominant firms, which can easily have their prices reflect changes in 
their costs, allows them to increase their money-wages more easily than weaker workers 
employed by competitive small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which cannot 
so readily adjust their prices to reflect cost changes (Allen, 1968). 
Starting from the fact that “the top-end wage inequality has increased more than low-
end wage inequality” (Lemieux, 2008), in accordance with the question “What types of 
employees have been steadily paid more by what type of employers?”, this paper aims 
to examine the relationship between wage inequality and market concentration (see 
Figure 1), which has not hitherto been elaborated in the literature. 
The higher impact of industry internal wage inequality (by 85-90%), as compared to 
cross-industry wage inequality, on overall wage inequality in the USA between 1965- 
2015 (Kristal and Cohen, 2016: 12) shows (i) that increased wage inequality across all 
sectors has been a macro issue, not a sectoral issue. Moreover, a long-lasting secular 
increase in wage differential indicates a structural change. (ii) If “the struggle about 
money-wages” (Keynes, 1936) within all sectors has been differentiated, then wage 
dispersion has to cover all occupations in all sectors. Since occupations are categorized 
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mainly as ancillary labor (white-collar work) and production labour (blue-collar work), 
the analysis relies on this distinction.
6
 
My distinction between white and blue-collar workers has nothing to do with the skill-
level of workers, unlike that proposed by the SBTC approach. Rather, it is based on the 
tasks workers perform. The essential point is whether these tasks are ancillary, 
innovative tasks whose purpose is to increase the market share / market power of the 
firm or tasks whose purpose is simply to produce goods and services. Blue-collar 
workers may also be highly-skilled, in order to be able to manage computers during the 
production process
7
. Gordon lists a wide range of ancillary tasks aimed at increasing 
market share (Gordon, 1998: 327)
8
. 
Two main approaches on wage differentials dominate the literature. Whereas the Skill-
Biased Technological Change (SBTC) approach
9
 identifies the computerization of 
production as the main reason behind wage dispersion, according to the alternative 
approach, which I call the Institutional Change approach
10
, rising wage differentials 
have been mainly driven by institutional changes (such as de-unionization, stagnating 
real minimum wages, performance-based pay, deregulation of labour markets, 
decentralisation of collective agreements [Wallerstein, 1999], a declining share of the 
government sector in employment, etc.). Kristal and Cohen claim that “the decline of 
pay-setting institutions is almost twice as important as technology-driven demand for 
skilled labour in explaining rising inequality within US industries” (Kristal and Cohen, 
2016: 21). 
In short, the debate is about whether wage dispersion has been driven by market forces 
or non-market forces. However, this debate has neither adequately considered the 
impact of change in market structure on wage dispersion nor its impact on market and 
non-market forces. Both approaches fail clearly to indicate what types of firms have 
been paying superior wages to a high-skilled labour force. They rely on assumptions 
that are appropriate to an average representative firm. 
This is not to say that I reject the impact of computerization and institutional changes on 
wage dispersion. What I try to show is that market structure also has a significant 
impact on wage dispersion
11
, based on the assumption that market structure 
                                                          
6 Due to the fall in the employment share of blue-collar workers, wage dispersion between blue-collar 
workers employed by large firms and those employed by small firms is negligible. Moreover, the relevant 
data was not available. 
7
 The white-collar/blue-collar distinction might appear confusing, since some jobs might correspond to 
white-collar jobs despite their having nothing to do with increasing market power. Nonetheless, it 
represents the option that can be most readily tackled by way of analysis of the available data. Calling 
innovative ancillary labour white-collar work and manual labour blue-collar work would not lead to 
crucial empirical and theoretical shortcomings, despite the existence of challenging examples such as 
cleaners, accountants, etc.  
8
 See Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) for a similar definitions and a similar distinction. 
9 See Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion and Howitt (2002), Autor et al (2005 and 2008), Autor (2014), 
Acemoglu (1998, 1999 and 2003), Acemoglu, and Autor (2010 and 2011), Burstein et al (2016), and Katz 
(1999). 
10 See Card (2001), Card and DiNardo (2002), Card, et.al (2004), DiNardo et.al  (1996), Kristal and 
Cohen (2016), Lemieux (2008) and Sjöberg, (2008), Freeman (1993 and 2005), Wallerstein (1999) and 
Wallerstein and Western (2000), and Herr et al (2014). 
11 The relationships between market concentration and both institutional changes (such as unionization, 
regulations, minimum wage, etc.) and technological changes lie outside the scope of this paper. For a 
discussion of the relationship between market concentration and unionization, see Hodson (1983), 
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differentiates the positions of employers and employees and thereby differentiates the 
struggle about money-wages among employees. 
In this paper, it will be suggested that increased market concentration has a significant 
and structural impact on the widening wage differentials between white and blue-collar 
workers (or, to put it differently, on the gap between the salaries of ancillary labour and 
the wages of production workers)
12
. 
To put it differently, the relationship between market concentration, on the one hand, 
and wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers, on the other, is a 
relationship of structural causality. By the word structural, I mean to imply that the 
relationship is not merely temporary and contingent, but has a long-lasting (and even 
maybe a path-creating) impact
13
. Since the increase in market concentration indicates a 
change in market structure
14
, its relationship with wages implies a structural causal 
relation. 
The argument relies theoretically on Minsky’s understanding of the output-price setting 
of price-taker and price-maker firms: In contrast to dominant price-maker firms, “price-
taking firms will tend to have smaller overhead and validating costs of capital per unit 
of output than price-making firms” (Minsky, 1986: 181). In keeping with this 
conception, I assume that in a more concentrated market structure, employment and pay 
of ancillary white-collar labour will be higher than manual blue-collar labour. More 
precisely, I do not discuss firm-size wage premiums among the same type of workers or 
intra-firm wage premiums (Jirjahn and Kraft, 2007), but rather a structural change in the 
market that causes wage dispersion among workers performing different tasks at the 
macro-level. 
The argument will be tested by way of US annual data for the period between 1966 and 
2011 using Vector Autoregressive (VAR) Model, as it is assumed that market 
concentration leads to wage dispersion in the long-term in the manner of a structural 
cause. The reason for using a US macro data set covering a 45-year time span is to 
demonstrate and to capture this long-run structural tendency during the recent decades 
in which the dramatic changes in question have taken place. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of the literature in section two, 
section three deals with the relationship between market structure and wage structure: 
namely, the theoretical explanation as to why white-collar workers’ salaries and 
employment share has a tendency to be higher in concentrated markets. Section four 
tests the argument empirically using a VAR model by way of the impulse response 
function (which reveals whether the causality is direct or not) and variance 
decomposition analysis. Finally, the last section concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Conyon (1992 and 1994), and Henley (1987), as well as Gordon (1998). De-unionization might be 
associated with the increase in the share of white-collar workers (see Figure 2), who have a relatively 
lower tendency to unionize (Aghion et al., 2001 and Mishel, 2012). See footnote 17 for suggested 
readings on the relationship between competition and innovation. 
12
 The question as to whether change in market concentration is the main factor and SBTC and 
institutional changes merely secondary factors calls for further research. 
13
 The flipside of this relationship, viz. that rising wage dispersion consolidates and spreads the 
concentration across sectors through white-collar workers’ consumption of expensive high-end goods 
produced by other dominant firms in other sectors, calls for further research.  
14
 A structural break in market concentration took place in 1982. See table 7 for structural break-test 
results. 
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2. Review of the Literature on the Relationship between Market 
Concentration and Wage Dispersion 
Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013) and the outdated contributions of Irfan (1979), 
Bruce (1968), Allen (1968), and Jones and Laudadio (1975) are the only studies that I 
could find that consider the relationship between market structure and wage 
differentials. However, their analyses refer to concentration at the sectoral level and 
wage dispersion between industries, not at the macro level, as discussed in this paper.  
Bruce (1968) and Irfan (1979) cannot support their hypotheses through empirical 
analyses. Irfan (1979: 40) found that market concentration (measured by the share of the 
four largest firms) had an only marginally significant (10% level) and weak impact on 
wage dispersion in  Pakistan between 1969 and 1971. Bruce (1968) concludes that  
What is not clear is whether the source of these relative wage gains has been the 
product-market monopoly power of the firms involved. In part, the observed 
relation between concentration and wage increases may have been spurious. 
(Bruce, 1968: 365) 
Using the Canadian dataset for the period between 1965 and 1969, Jones and Laudadio 
(1975) found that goods market imperfection has a role on wage differentials by way of 
higher unionization in concentrated sectors. But they did not employ the same 
theoretical reasoning as this paper and they did not focus on the macro level. Allen 
concludes that “concentration was significantly and almost continuously associated 
with larger annual increases in earnings from 1951 to 1962” (Allen, 1968: 359). 
Lin and Tomaskovic-Devey (2013), on the other hand, do not take into account 
concentration as a leading decisive factor. Rather, they employ it in their regression 
only as a control variable and find that it has a negative relationship with wage 
inequality, even though they also found that it has a positive impact on managerial pay.  
Autor et al. (2005) consider changing employment composition with regard to rising 
upper-end wage inequality. They do not, however, take into account the rise of higher-
paid white-collar workers as a function of an increase in market concentration at the 
macro level. Antonczyk et al. (2010) found that in the case of western Germany 
between 2001 and 2006, firm size played only a small role in wage inequality 
(Antonczyk et al., 2010: 21 and 40). Card et al. (2016) claim that firm size matters for 
wage inequality with regard to productivity differences for the same occupation groups. 
But they do not deal with the rise in market concentration and change in the 
composition of occupations (i.e. with respect to white- and blue-collar workers). 
Besides Minsky (1986: 174), Gordon (1998) and Sawyer (1985: 27), Cowling (1982) 
also recognizes that the rising degree of monopoly, i.e. concentration, is associated with 
increasing overhead costs (namely, non-production costs including the salaries of white-
collar workers) in the UK economy since the mid-1960s (Cowling, 1982: 173). 
However, this work is also outdated. 
Fernandes et al. (2014a), Murphy (2013), and Hartzell and Starks (2003) deal with the 
relationship between level of competition and executive pay, but not specifically with 
the wage differential between white-collar and blue-collar workers. Fernandes et al. 
(2014b) discusses skill premium and concentration. Its findings, however, stand in 
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contradiction to the argument of this paper: “increased product market competition, 
which resulted from deregulation, increased the returns to a university degree and the 
returns to skill”.  
Almeida-Santos et al. (2010) deals with wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-
collar workers, but merely in relation to training. 
Palley (2006 and 2015) deals with the impact of wage dispersion between managers and 
production workers on growth and on the character of the growth in question (i.e. wage-
led or profit-led), but not with market concentration. Vasudevan (2015) emphasizes the 
role of managerial class in rising the markup rate, but not the role of white-collar 
workers as this paper does. 
Thus one of the original contributions of this paper is to reveal the structural 
relationship between market concentration and wage differential and to test it via 
contemporary macro-data. 
 
3. Understanding the Wage Structure via the Market Structure 
For a more coherent and comprehensive explanation of rising wage inequality, it should 
first be clarified what type of firms pay more to what type of employees. However, 
economists have not paid attention to the impact of firm size on wage dispersion, 
because of the belief that “inter-size wage differentials are minor” (Tachibanaki, 1997: 
12). This belief might arise from the fact that they pay attention to intra-occupational 
inequality among firms (generally speaking, within blue-collar occupations and white-
collar occupations, taken separately), but not to cross-occupational inequality. 
Cross-occupational inequality has to be taken into account, due to the fact that large 
firms employ more and pay more on overhead and to ancillary salary earners – namely, 
white-collar workers (who carry out innovative tasks such as R&D, design and 
differentiation of products, financial/capital market operations, market research, 
advertising and sales operations, etc.) – as compared to manual labour (blue-collar 
workers) (Minsky, 1986). 
Tachibanaki claims that the wage gap between white-collar and blue-collar workers is a 
universal fact, apart from a few exceptions (Tachibanaki, 1997: 2). However, there is no 
explanation provided for the increase in wage dispersion that has been experienced in 
the last three decades. 
Regarding why white-collars are paid more, it has been argued that white-collar jobs 
require education and training to handle more complicated and difficult tasks 
(Tachibanaki, 1997: 2-3). 
However, the abovementioned non-production tasks performed by white-collar workers 
are not paid more just because they are complicated and difficult, but also because they 
function to increase or at least to preserve the market share of the firm (Kalecki, 1954; 
Minsky, 1986; Sawyer, 1981 and 1985; Shepherd, 1997; Steindl, 1990). In the case of 
such tasks, whether through cost-reducing new production technologies or through 
demand-elasticity reducing product differentiations and advertising (Sawyer, 1981: 107-
111), the aim is to reduce the break-even point of the firm where costs and revenues are 
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equalized (Steindl, 1990: 305-306). Once the break-even point has been lowered, the 
firm can either charge a higher markup or reduce its prices to drive rivals out of the 
market or to prevent new entries into the market. Hence, as Steindl notes, “break-even 
point is a measure of the degree of monopoly” and “the break-even point will be lower if 
mark-up is higher” (ibid., 307). 
In this connection, it could be argued that large dominant firms are inclined to employ 
and pay more to white-collar workers, in order to increase and/or maintain their 
dominance. Due to their stronger balance sheets, larger firms are more capable of doing 
so (Minsky, 1986: 181). Small firms, due to their more elastic demand curves and 
restrictive cost structures, cannot afford to employ and to pay white-collar workers as 
much as large firms.
15
  
It should be noted that I do not mean that large firms pay higher wages merely after 
white-collar workers have accomplished innovative tasks and if they have increased the 
firm’s market share. Rather, the already dominant large firms, as well as firms that 
endeavor to challenge the dominant firms via innovation, employ relatively more and 
hence pay more to white-collar workers than blue-collar workers for their market-
power-increasing innovative tasks.
16
 Wright stresses that “large-scale, monopoly 
corporations, therefore, would be expected to have steeper income gradients within 
their managerial structures than would smaller, competitive enterprises” (Wright, 1979: 
90). 
Sawyer asserts that the risks and costs of innovations that are brought about by the 
employment of scientists and engineers favour large firms (Sawyer, 1981: 126) and he 
notes that in the mid-1960s in the UK, large 100 firms accounted for 69.5% of R&D 
programs.
17
 The United States Department of Agriculture provides more current 
empirical evidence, showing that market concentration in the agriculture sector has 
increased from 1994 to 2009 and the “the largest agricultural input firms are 
responsible for a large and growing share of global agricultural research and 
development” (USDA, 2012)18.  
Hence, R&D and the computerization of production technology, which might be 
conceived as technological instrument for reducing the break-even point, have for the 
most part been first introduced by large firms that can afford them. Innovation does not 
drop from the sky by itself; rather, it is a byproduct of market forces. 
                                                          
15
 SMEs running non-production businesses (such as consulting, finance, accounting, insurance, 
advertising, market research, and so on) can be regarded as derivative of the rising market concentration, 
since these SMEs mostly undertake outsourced tasks. For a discussion outsourced tasks and global value 
chains, see Gereffi et al. (2005). 
16
 As premiums, fees, commissions, and bonuses in return for the success of white-collar workers are not 
recorded in income statements under wages and salaries, we cannot conceive of them in terms of a wage 
differential that reflects the difference between the salaries of ancillary labour and the wages of 
production labour. 
17
 For discussion from a Schumpeterian viewpoint of the (inverted U-shaped) relation between level of 
competition and innovation or technological advances, see Tingvall (2006), Crespi (2008), and Aghion 
(2005). Very briefly, this literature suggests that after a certain point of market concentration, as long as 
they can keep their market share under the given conditions, dominant firms do not innovate, even though 
they can afford to do so, because of lower competitive challenges. 
18
http://www.ers.usda.gov/amber-waves/2012-december/rising-concentration-in-agricultural-input-
industries-influences-new-technologies.aspx#.V87qtjVMr6n 
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Elucidating the relationship between the break-even point and overhead costs (paid to 
white-collar worker) by way of price-output settings of firms would help us to 
comprehend why larger firms pay and employ more white-collar workers and thereby 
how wage differentials have essentially been driven by rising market concentration.  
One of the most important differences between the price-output settings of price-taking 
small firms and price-making large firms is that whereas price-makers can vary their 
output level between a lower break-even point and an upper break-even point
19
 in a 
wider range against deviations in demand
20
, price-takers do not have this possibility
21
. 
This is because price-takers “are forced to accept what they can get; they take price as a 
parameter and set output along their MC [marginal cost] curve” (Minsky, 1986: 181).  
The second important difference between price-taking and price-making firms is the gap 
between their cost curves. Firstly, the gap between the price level and average 
technologically determined costs (i.e. average direct production costs; ADPC), namely 
markup (ibid., 173), is wider in the case of oligopoly. Secondly, larger firms have a 
wider gap between ADPC and average overhead costs (AVOV), as they employ more 
white-collar workers (in sales operations, advertising, marketing, design, R&D, 
business management, etc.) in pursuit of enhancing and preserving their market share.
22
 
For example, Sawyer reports that according to the findings of Marcus, based on a 
sample of 78 consumer goods industries, advertising can contribute to industrial 
concentration (Sawyer, 1981: 118). 
From this it could be inferred that a higher markup, and a higher share of AVOV within 
costs, would widen the gap between the lower break-even point and the upper break-
even point, since innovative tasks performed by overhead labour lower the break-even 
point and thereby increase the markup. Minsky underscores this point as follows:  
Market power, which allows a firm to constrain price movements when demand 
falls, may be a prerequisite for the use of expensive and highly specialized capital 
assets and large-scale debt financing. (Minsky, 1986: 181) 
However, “price-taking firms will tend to have smaller overhead and validating costs of 
capital per unit of output than price-making firms (ibid., 181). This is because in order 
to have a buffer against falling prices, smaller competitive firms have to hold debt and 
overhead costs at a lower level and near to technologically-determined costs. It is thus 
that they are able to survive if prices fall dramatically. 
The other factor explaining why the share of white-collar workers within employment 
                                                          
19
 Beyond the lower break-even point, revenues exceed costs; and beyond the upper break-even point, 
costs again exceed revenues. 
20
 Being able to vary output corresponds to large firms’ ability to hold the desired excess capacity, as 
Steindl (1952) has pointed out. 
21
 See Lee (1999) for discussion of Post-Keynesian pricing theory. I prefer Minsky’s pricing model, as he 
considers the role played by the financial situation (cash-flows) of firms in pricing decisions. 
22
 Minsky defines this difference “as allocations of profits, a use of the surplus” (Minsky, 1986: 173). It 
is, however, debatable whether salaries of white-collar, ancillary workers should be considered as wage 
costs or allocation of profit. Although it falls outside the scope of this paper, I would just like to point out 
that in order to be able to define salaries of ancillary labour as “profit allocation”, they would have to be 
paid under the condition of profit realization. If they are paid regardless of profit realization, like wages to 
production labour, then they must be considered as wage costs. King and Regan (1976) criticizes Kalecki, 
since he treats salaries as fixed costs. 
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rises with market concentration is that “overhead, advertising, research and 
development expenditures, and staffs will be protected until output approaches and even 
falls below O1
23” (ibid., 180). Besides the higher blue-collar unemployment rate, 
according to the database of the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS), the average 
displacement rate of white-collar workers between 1981 and 1998 was 2.71%, whereas 
for blue-collar workers it was 4.62%.
24
 The argument is also supported by the findings 
of Dwyer and Wright (2003: 304), which suggest that net job creation in the top-paying 
quintiles was not negative during the contractions of 1973-74 and 1980-82
25
.  
Two main concerns explain the protection afforded the employment of ancillary white-
collar workers: (i) the higher turnover costs of white-collar workers due to training and 
replacement costs; and (ii) the market-share-increasing strategic role of the tasks 
performed by white-collars. 
 
Figure 2: Share of college graduates within employment and employment share of firms with more 
than 250 employees, 1973-2015, USA. Source: http://www.epi.org/data/#?preset=wage-education 
and http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data_firm.html 
As a result, as the ratio of white-collars workers to blue-collar workers – or, in other 
words, the share of overhead costs within overall production costs – rises, higher 
markups become more applicable (Sawyer, 1985: 27). As Minsky puts it: 
                                                          
23
 O1 refers to the lower break-even point. 
24
 http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2001/july/wk5/art04.txt 
25
 It was only during the contraction of 1990-92 that it was negative, but still less so than in the other 
quintiles. This means that the contraction of 1990-92 caused large firms’ output to fall under the break-
even point. 
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If the ratio of overhead and ancillary wages to technologically determined 
wages is higher for every output, then the markup and the price of the product 
will be greater for every level of output than in the absence of such spending. 
(Minsky, 1986: 174) 
Within this framework, the rise of white-collar workers
26
 (as shown in Figure 2) seems 
to be the product not only of exogenous SBTC, but also of market concentration, since 
dominant firms employ “expensive and highly specialized capital assets” (Minsky, 
1986: 181) and white-collar workers, in order to enhance and preserve their market 
power and market share.  
It should be kept in mind that the diffusion of a new innovation – either in production 
technologies or in advertisement, sales promotions, product differentiation, etc. – 
introduced by a single (large) firm depends on the employment share of white-collar 
workers in other firms: workers that are need to implement and adopt or to imitate this 
new innovation. The higher share of white-collar workers within an industry expedites 
the diffusion of new innovations to other firms. This, in turn, creates a path in which 
market concentration and the employment of white-collar workers feed back upon 
themselves until a certain threshold has been reached. 
Since the market power of price-takers is restricted, their ability to employ ancillary 
labour and the share of overhead costs in their costs are also restricted as compared to 
large firms. The combination of Figure 1 and Figure 2 would support this argument: 
There is a very strong relationship between the rise of white-collar workers’ share in 
employment composition and measured market concentration. This relationship will be 
tested in the empirical part. 
In the case of a concentrated market, effective demand is structurally weakened by the 
increased wage dispersion between white and blue-collar workers (see Figure 1), as this 
leads to a decrease in the purchasing power of blue-collar workers and to an increase in 
the savings of white-collar workers. The following price equation helps to explain this:  
𝑃𝑐 =
𝑊𝑐
𝐴𝑐
(1 +
𝑊𝑖𝑁𝑖
𝑊𝑐𝑁𝑐
+
𝐷𝑓
𝑊𝑐𝑁𝑐
+
𝜋𝑇𝜋
𝑊𝑐𝑁𝑐
+
𝐶𝜋
𝑊𝑐𝑁𝑐
−
𝑆𝑤
𝑊𝑐𝑁𝑐
)27 
Equation 1: Price equation of Minsky. Source: Minsky (1986: 171) 
If we modify Minsky’s price equation (Equation 1) by replacing the Wi and Ni (wages 
and numbers of workers in the capital goods producing sector) with Ww, Nw (wages 
and numbers of white-collar workers) and the Wc and the Nc (wages and numbers of 
workers in the consumption goods producing sector) with wages and numbers of blue-
collar workers (Wb, Nb), we obtain: 
𝑃𝑐 =
𝑊𝑏
𝐴𝑏
(1 +
𝑊𝑤𝑁𝑤
𝑊𝑏𝑁𝑏
+. . −
𝑆𝑤
𝑊𝑏𝑁𝑏
) 
Equation 2: Modified price equation 
                                                          
26
 The share of college graduates has increased from 14.6% in 1973 to 35.9% in 2015 (See 
http://www.epi.org/data/#?preset=wage-education) 
27
 Df stands for trade deficit, 𝜋𝑇𝜋 for goverment deficit, C𝜋 for consumption out of profits, Sw for 
savings out of wages. 
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Minsky does not himself modify his equation in terms of white and blue-collar workers, 
but makes a statement that supports the procedure: 
The greater the ratio of wage income from ancillary and overhead services to 
wage income that is determined by technology, the higher the demand price per 
unit of output relative to technologically mandated production costs. (ibid., 174) 
From this point of view, the differentiation of the struggle about money-wages between 
blue-collar and white-collar workers can be better understood. The higher-markup-
charged, high-end goods produced by dominant firms are consumed mostly by higher-
paid white-collar workers employed by large firms, whereas lower-paid blue-collar 
workers’ consumption of these expensive goods is more restricted. 
In other words, in the case of concentrated markets, higher markups are reflected in a 
higher price level, as white-collar workers validate their own employment via their 
consumption,  which has been enabled by the higher wage dispersion (ibid., 174). 
There are two main empirical findings that support the argument that the main leading 
factor behind rising wage dispersion is an increase in market concentration. Firstly, as 
reported by Kristal and Cohen, about 85-90% of overall wage dispersion in the USA 
between 1965 and 2015 was brought about by industry-internal wage dispersion. The 
rest (15%) can be attributed to dispersion between industries (Kristal and Cohen, 2016: 
12). If the wage dispersion between industries had a stronger impact on overall 
dispersion, then it would be possible to say that (i) the dispersion has increased merely 
because of some technological, institutional or other external changes, which led only 
some industries to expand and thereby to be able to pay more as compared to other 
industries and (ii) that this process has not been diffused to other sectors. 
In this sense, the argument that a sectoral shift (i.e. a shift from the production to the 
service sector) might be an explanatory factor behind wage dispersion (Heise, 1997: 
369) appear to be unconvincing for two reasons: firstly, since labour supply would 
adapt to the changes in sectoral requirements in the long-run, which might reduce wage 
dispersion. Secondly, all sectors, including the service sector, have experienced both 
concentration and wage dispersion (See Figure 3). 
The stronger impact of industry-internal wage dispersion on overall dispersion also 
confirms that all sectors have experienced the rise of large firms that can more readily 
afford the payment and employment of white-collar workers. This point justifies the use 
of market concentration at the macro-level, since the concentration in question is a 
structural and a macro issue. 
The second point is that top-end wage inequality has increased more than low-end wage 
inequality (Lemieux, 2008). According to my own calculations based on The State of 
America
28
 dataset, whereas for male wage-earners, wage inequality between the 50
th
 and 
10
th
 percentiles has increased in the USA from 1973 to 2012 by 5.7% (and for female 
wage earners, by 6.55%), the dispersion between the 90
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles of male 
wage earners has widened by 32.8% (for female workers, by 28.9%). The faster 
increase in top-end wage dispersion as a function of managerial pay-schemes is also a 
result of an increasing number of large firms, which prioritize the employment of 
                                                          
28
 http://stateofworkingamerica.org/chart/swa-wages-figure-4k-wage-inequality-men/ 
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managerial white-collar workers and can afford it. Tosi et.al. show that “firm size 
accounts for more than 40% of the variance in total CEO pay” (Tosi et.al., 2000: 329). 
In a report for the World Bank
29
, Kelly et al. (2017: 170) show that wage inequality in 
Europe has been driven by firm inequality. Shin reports that “the main driver of the 
widening gap between executives and workers was the rise in executive compensation, 
rather than stagnant wages for workers” (Shin, 2014: 29-30) and that “firms hired 
external CEOs tend to have a wider wag gap” (ibid., 19). 
To sum up, as wage dispersion (i.e. paying more to employees than other firms) requires 
larger firms, a structural, secular increase in wage dispersion would not be possible if 
there was no structural, secular rise in market concentration. That is to say that without 
any change in market structure, which might have been underpinned by SBTC and/or 
institutional change, a change in wage differential would be temporary, since the 
workforce would adapt to the changing requirements in the medium or long-run
30
. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
This chapter deals with empirical testing of the main argument that there is a direct 
relationship of structural causality between wage dispersion and market concentration. 
Before testing the structural relationship between a widening wage differential and 
market concentration at the macro level, an industry-level comparison would be helpful. 
Figure 3 depicts the co-movement of the growth rates of wage differentials and of 
market concentration ratios (revenue share of 50 largest firms) from 1997 to 2012 in 
trade, and the transportation and FIRE (finance, insurance and real estate) sectors
31
. The 
transportation sector has experienced the highest level of concentration and also of wage 
dispersion, whereas the FIRE sector has experienced the lowest. 
                                                          
29
 https://www.worldbank.org/en/region/eca/publication/digital-dividends-in-eca 
30
 For example, the share of low-wage workers with a high school degree increased from 48% in 1968 to 
79% in 2012 (See Mishel, 2014). This shows that low-wage workers have upgraded their skills. 
31
 Only these three sectors were available for comparison  from both sources. 
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Figure 3: Growth rates of market concentration ratios (Revenue share of 50 large firms) and of 
wage differentials (=log wage 90/50) in FIRE, trade and transportation sectors from 1997 to 2012, 
USA. Sources: census.gov and Kristal and Cohen (2016: 14) respectively. 
4.1. Description and Justification of the Dataset 
In this subsection, I define the variables and elaborate the theoretical reasoning behind 
their employment in the model. 
4.1.1. Degree of Monopoly 
Per Kaleckian theory (Kalecki, 1954), it is assumed that firms would be able to charge a 
higher markup rate per unit of production over their labour and raw material costs in 
line with their market power: “The increasing market concentration tends undoubtedly 
to raise the degree of monopoly in the long run” (Kalecki, 1990: 247). More 
concentrated markets would be characterised by higher markup rates (Kalecki, 2009: 
30; cited in Rugitsky, 2013). 
From a Steindlian perspective, the second crucial feature of concentrated markets is that 
dominant firms have a tendency to maintain a higher (desired) level of excess capacity 
as a “barrier to entry”, i.e. in order to be able to prevent potential new entries into the 
market that could be spurred on by the higher markups, and as a precautionary measure, 
such as to be able to maintain their market share in case of unexpected demand shocks 
(Steindl, 1952: 55). Secondly, concerning costs, Steindl states that “average cost of 
larger equipment with excess capacity is smaller than average cost of smaller 
equipment with full capacity. So that long run cost curve declines” (ibid., 10). To put it 
5
6
7
8
9
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concentration wage diff
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differently, with the increase of capital equipment size, firms might enjoy decreasing 
average cost due to excess capacity.  
As firms try first to protect the employment of white-collar workers (Minsky, 1986: 
180) and by virtue of the the higher displacement rate of blue-collar workers, greater 
excess capacity implies a higher unemployment rate of blue-collar workers, who 
represent the main source of ADPC. A correllation of 0.74 between excess capacity
32
 
and the blue-collar unemployment rate
33
 in the period 1973-2011 supports this 
reasoning.  
It can be inferred that in the case of a concentrated market structure, the share of 
production wages within value added (the opposite of Equation 3) would be lower, 
since prices go up due to the higher markup that is made possible both by the lower 
price elasticity of demand of white-collar workers and by the higher employment share 
and higher salaries of white-collar workers, whose innovative tasks reduce the break-
even point. 
As a lower share of production wages within value added also reflects a lower break-
even point, Gordon’s (1998) proposition to measure the degree of monopoly by “the 
ratio of value added to wages of production labour” represents a better measurement of 
concentration, since value added includes profits after taxes and cost of capital.
34
 
Besides being consistent with the foregoing theoretical reasoning based on Kalecki 
(1954) and Steindl (1990), it also has the advantage of leaving out the “counter-cycle 
performance of simple Kaleckian calculation of degree of monopoly” (Kriesler, 1987: 
38). 
Secondly, it better corresponds to the output-price-cost settings in which markups are 
charged over ADPC, which mainly consist of wages paid to production labor and raw 
materials (Minsky, 1986: 174). Thirdly, it is also consistent with Equation 2, which 
explains the price level via the ratio of the number and salaries of white-collar workers 
to the number and wages of blue-collar workers. 
The calculation of the degree of monopoly (m) is as follows: The ratio of Gross value 
added of nonfinancial corporate business (a)
35
 to the total wages of production labor, 
which is calculated as the product of Average Hourly Earnings of Production and 
Nonsupervisory Employees in Total Private Sector (p)
36
 times total hours worked (h)
37
: 
𝑚 =
𝑎 
𝑝 ∗ ℎ 
 
Equation 3: Degree of Monopoly 
An aggregate concentration measurement has the advantage of capturing both changing 
concentration within industries and the changing shares of industries within GDP 
                                                          
32
 See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TCU 
33
 http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/charts/unemployment-job-category/ 
34
 Value Added = Net Operating Profit After Taxes (NOPAT) - Invested Capital * Weighted Average 
Cost of Capital (WACC). It should be noted that the simple Kaleckian calculation of the degree of 
monopoly (or Lerner Index), which overlooks capital costs, might not provide accurate results. 
35
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A455RC1Q027SBEA 
36
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AHETPI 
37
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTLQ 
Dögüs: Rising Wage Dispersion and Market Concentration  
15 
 
(Cowling, 1982: 161)
38
. 
Nevertheless, in order to check the plausibility of the ratio of value added to wages of 
production workers as a measurement of market concentration at the macro level, in 
addition to the Figure 3, the following chart could be useful. It shows the number and 
percentage of US manufacturing industries in which the largest four companies 
accounted for at least 50 percent of shipment value in their industries. 
 
Figure 4: Number and Percentage of U.S. Manufacturing Industries in which the Largest Four 
Companies Accounted for at Least 50 Percent of Shipment Value in Their Industries, 1947-2007. 
Source: Calculation of Foster et al. (2011) based on census.gov
39
 
4.1.2. Wage Differential 
As I am directly dealing with the dispersion between wages of production workers and 
salaries of overhead labour and I have argued that the difference between them 
determines the markup rate, I employ the ratio of average hourly wages of non-
production (overhead) workers to average hourly wages of production workers to 
measure the wage differential at the macro level. 
The wage differential (wd) as the ratio of the salaries of ancillary white-collar non-
production workers to the wages of blue-collar production workers is calculated as 
follows: 
                                                          
38
 Two reasons why I do not prefer an average weighted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) or the share 
of the n-largest firms within the sector, which is the most common measurement for concentration, is that, 
firstly, the available data is not provided as continuous time-series and, secondly, it is not clear how to 
calculate the weight of sectors relative to their shares in GDP or to their capital or employment intensity 
for the purpose of obtaining a proper measurement. Thirdly, and more importantly, as import firms also 
have a significant share in consumer goods and services, the share of n-largest US-firms might not give 
accurate results. Finally, as pointed out by Kriesler (1987: 24), HHI does not consider the structure 
(elasticity) of demand. 
39
 https://monthlyreview.org/2011/04/01/monopoly-and-competition-in-twenty-first-century-capitalism 
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𝑤𝑑 =
𝑐/ℎ − 𝑝 
𝑝 
 
Equation 1: Wage Differential 
In the equation, c stands for compensation of all employees
40
, h for total worked 
hours
41
, and p for the annual average hourly wages paid to production workers
42
. The 
numerator gives the average hourly wages paid to ancillary (overhead) non-production 
employees: namely, to white-collar workers.  
It could be argued that it would be plausible to employ top-end wage dispersion (see the 
wage differential between the 90
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles, as shown in Figure 5) in the 
model to capture the wage dispersion between white and blue-collar workers and its 
long-run structural relationship with market concentration. However, top-end wage 
inequality might contain the impacts of non-economic factors such as age, ethnicity, 
race, gender, experience, region, public sector employment, and so on. The 97-percent 
correlation of the wage differential between white-collar and blue-collar workers (see 
Figure 1) with the wage differential 90/50 confirms that it also can be considered as top-
end wage inequality. 
Another reasonable criticism could be that the college premium should be employed in 
the model instead of the wage differential between production workers and non-
production ancillary labour. This might also represent an appropriate and useful tool for 
challenging the SBTC approach, which employs it in defense of the argument that 
computerization has led to wage dispersion.  
                                                          
40
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A576RC1 
41
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTLQ 
42
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AHETPI and https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A132RC1 
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Figure 5: College Premium (wage difference ratio of college graduates to high school graduates) 
and Wage Differential between 90
th
 and 50
th
 Percentiles. 1973-2011. Sources: 
epi.org/data/#?preset=wage-education and stateofworkingamerica.org, Figures 4K and 4L. 
Secondly, a comparison of occupation and education based on datasets of the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey suggests
43
 that we can assume that non-production workers consist 
of college-graduates and that this would not lead to any serious empirical or theoretical 
shortcomings. However, employing the college premium for wage dispersion might not 
give accurate results, due to the underemployment of college graduates (i.e. their 
employment in jobs that do not require college degrees), which has increased from 
25,2% in 2000 to 28,2% in 2011, and also because wages of the 20th percentile of 
college graduates have experienced a decline of 4,5% in the same period, whereas the 
wages of the 90th percentile of college graduates increased by 2,1%. (See 
stateofworkingamerica.org, Figures 4AJ and 4AK.) Thirdly, the college premium does 
not consider the workers who have had some years of college without completing a 
degree and who accounts for approximately 19% of the workforce
44
. These workers 
might be employed in white-collar jobs as well. Finally, since the college premium was 
stable during the 2000s, due to rising underemployment of college graduates, whereas 
wage inequality between 90th and 50th percentiles (see Figure 5) increased, the college 
premium seems not to be an accurate indicator for measuring wage inequality. 
4.2.The Model 
Before running the data analysis, it is worth emphasizing that employment of white-
collar workers performing innovative tasks (such as R&D, advertisement, 
                                                          
43
 Results are available upon request. 
44
 http://www.epi.org/data/#?preset=wage-education 
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financial/capital market operations, market research, etc.) to reduce the break-even point 
in order, such as to be able to charge a higher markup, is not the sole factor behind 
rising market concentration. It is rather a contributing factor, which is meant to maintain 
or increase the market share of the firm. As indicated by Toporowski (2016), Brennan 
(2016), Minsky (1986), and Blonigen and Pierce (2016), market concentration is a 
matter of privatizations and capital market operations, such as mergers & acquisitions 
and hostile takeovers, rather than of goods market operations.  
The dominant corporations of today, such as General Electric, Tata, Boeing, or 
Microsoft, did not achieve their preeminence through their ability to produce 
electrical equipment, steel, aircraft, or software better than their competitors, 
but by buying up those competitors in the stock market. (Toporowski, 2016: 4) 
As the main argument of the paper is that there is a structural and direct causal 
relationship between market concentration and wage dispersion, a VAR model with 
impulse response function and variance decomposition analysis is one of the best 
options for examining such an argument
45. In VAR Model, “each endogenous variable 
is assumed to depend on lagged values of itself and of all other endogenous variables” 
(Dées and Güntner, 2016: 5). Such an assumption is appropriate both for market 
concentration and wage dispersion, since, as pointed out above, they feed back upon 
themselves. The non-stationarity of variables (see Table 1 in the appendix) confirms 
that both variables are being affected by their lagged values. 
As the variables have either non-stationarity or trend and have no co-integration 
problem, I employ their log differences and run an unrestricted Vector Autoregressive 
Model with E-Views 8. AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) suggests a 2-period lag 
length. The LM Autocorrelation test results also indicate that the model has no 
autocorrelation problem. The model also has no stability problem, according to the 
Inverse Roots of the AR Characteristic Polynomial. (See the appendix for all test 
results). 
In line with theoretical framework outlined above, I prefer to align the variables within 
the model as follows: degree of monopoly (m), wage differential (wd). So the VAR(2) 
model equation has the following form: 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑐1 + ß11
1
 
𝑚𝑡−1 + ß12
1
 
𝑤𝑑𝑡−1 +
 ß11
2
 
𝑚𝑡−2 + ß12
2
 
𝑤𝑑𝑡−2
 
 
 
𝑤𝑑 = 𝑐1 + ß21
1
 
𝑚𝑡−1 + ß22
1
 
𝑤𝑑𝑡−1 +
 ß21
2
 
𝑚𝑡−2 + ß22
2
 
𝑤𝑑𝑡−2
 
  
Equation 5: VAR(2) Model Equation 
As this paper deals merely with the causality running from market concentration to 
wage dispersion, the flipside of the relationship (i.e. causality running from wage 
dispersion to concentration) is neglected and left for another paper – this despite the fact 
that VAR Model assumes that the relationship is bi-directional. 
4.3. Results 
                                                          
45
 As to why I do not opt for any endogenous or exogenous control variable in the model, it is due to the 
fact that what is being tested is merely whether the causality is a direct or not. 
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The impulse response function reveals whether the causality between variables is direct 
or not and variance decomposition analysis “provides valuable supplementary 
information about the interlinkages among the variables in the model” (Greenwood-
Nimmo and Tarassow, 2013: 12). Both analyses provide structural clarification of how 
strong and how long-lasting the effects are. Moreover, the impulse response function 
has an advantage inasmuch as it reveals that the power of the effects is not stable, but 
rather might fluctuate and might even turn in the opposite direction (from positive to 
negative and vice-versa) after a certain time. 
Tarassow (2010) describes what is being analyzed by way of the impulse response 
function and variance decomposition as follows: 
impulse-response function which computes the propagation over time of a shock 
on the variable of interest. The variance decomposition analyzes the relative 
impact of a shock in one variable on the total variance of the variable of interest 
– it measures the relative impact of a structural shock for the explanation of the 
total variance of the dependent variable. (Tarassow, 2010: 14-15). 
 
Figure 6: Impulse Response Function Results
46
 for the period 1966-2011 
Analysis of the impulse response function results shown in Figure 6 is as follows
47
: 
                                                          
46
 The IRF-figures represent the accumulated responses, since the growth rates (log differences) of the 
variable are employed in the model. Secondly, accumulated responses indicate that the shocks create a 
path: i.e. that the responses are not temporary. The dotted lines represent the standard errors, i.e. the 95% 
significance level. If both of the dotted lines are not in the same area (i.e. if one is above and the other is 
under the 0 (zero)), then responses are not significant. In this case, one period represents one year, since 
the data is annual. 
47
 See Table 5 in the appendices for the values. 
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The responses of wage differential to concentration are positive and significant over 10 
periods and peaks at the 3
rd
 period. This result does not falsify and in fact strongly 
supports the main argument of this paper that large firms in higher concentrated 
markets, or firms endeavoring to increase their market share, can employ and pay more 
to white-collar workers, in order to preserve or increase their market shares thanks to 
innovative tasks performed by white-collar workers. As the impulses do not die out, we 
can conclude that responses to the shocks are not temporary, but rather long-lasting, and 
that the shocks seem to have created a path, i.e. led to a structural change. 
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Figure 7: Variance Decomposition Analysis Results 
In the short term, as shown by Figure 7, 18% of the variations in wage differential are 
due to market concentration and this figure reaches 30% at second period and thereafter. 
The fact that 30% of long-term variations in wage differential are explained by market 
concentration confirms that the relationship is one of structural causality
48
. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed the very simple question “What types of employees have been 
paid more by what type of employers?” and it has been argued that there is a direct and 
structural relationship at the macro level between market concentration and wage 
differentials between white-collar and blue-collar workers.  
VAR Model analysis results based on US-data between 1966 and 2011 show that the 
hypothesis that the relationship is structural has not been falsified at least at 95% 
confidence level. The findings show that the responses of wage dispersion to one-unit 
shock in market concentration are positive and significant over 10 years. Furthermore, 
18% of variations in wage dispersion in the short-run and 30% of variations in the long-
run are explained by market concentration. As the responses of wage differential to 
shocks of market concentration are not temporary, but rather long-lasting and do not die 
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out, the shocks seem to have created a path. 
It could be inferred that if the employment share and salaries of white-collar workers 
had not increased due to concentration, then the concentration would not be structural 
and long-lasting. Rather, it would be temporary, since higher concentration strengthens 
its relationship with wage dispersion. 
The paper has made some innovative contributions to the literature by incorporating 
market structure and wage structure in a dynamic empirical analysis of the 
contemporary macro dataset. Firstly, it has revealed the relationship between market 
concentration, on the one hand, and wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-
collar workers, on the other.  
Secondly, the paper opens a new space in which to discuss an issue stressed by Palley 
(2006 and 2015): viz. that the distribution of wage income among wage earners 
represents a decisive factor not only with respect to personal income distribution, but 
also with respect to the “functional income distribution between capital and labour 
which is a function of market structure” (Kalecki, 1971). 
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Table 2: Johansen System Co-integration Test Results 
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Table 4: Lag Order Selection Criteria 
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Figure 8: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
 
Table 5: Impulse Response Function 
 
Table 6: Variance Decomposition 
 
Dögüs: Rising Wage Dispersion and Market Concentration  
33 
 
Table 7: Structural-Break Test: Market Concentration 
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